



THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY

VOLUME I

By:

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CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER 1

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MULTI-FIRM CONDUCT: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS

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CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 6

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